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Planning the new industrial nation: Scotland 1931 to 1979. 
According to Benedict Anderson, nations are 'imagined communities' that are 
nonetheless constructed on the foundations of material circumstance and by the 
conscious decisions of their builders.1 As Anderson shows, the ways that a nation 
can be imagined are historically contingent. Under certain circumstances the 
nation is imagined through economics: ‘the economy is not pre-existing reality, an 
object which we simply observe and theorise about. Our understanding of the 
“economy” as a distinct entity, a distinct social “sphere” or social “system”, is the 
product of a dramatic process of imaginative abstraction and representational labour’.2 
Over the twentieth century as government policy played a more active role in 
determining economic outcomes and especially through the mid-century promise of 
planning, the economic sphere became increasingly understood in politicised, and 
therefore national, terms. This paper analyses the particular form of economic 
imagining of one nation, Scotland, in a specific time period, the years from the 
economic crisis of 1931 down to the arrival of the Thatcher government in 1979.   
In that period there emerged a predominant image of Scotland as an ‘industrial 
nation’, and an industrial nation that needed planned change. This had a strong basis 
in the popular national imaginary that embedded an understanding of the Scottish 
nation within occupational identities and workplace cultures.3 The predominance of 
these identifications is clear in mid-twentieth century information films such as the 
1938 Wealth of a Nation, which emphasised the contribution of coal mining, 
steelmaking and shipbuilding to the Scottish economy and depicted masculine labour 
in heavy industries. However, addressing the conditions of the Depression, and the 
problems it had created for these export-facing ‘staple’ industries the film notes 
“Scotsmen faced the problem of reshaping their national policy.”4 It anticipated the 
post-Second World War adoption of heightened state planning and a more active 
regional policy to bring ‘new’ industries to Scotland, and to rationalise the staple 
industries. This included public ownership of mining and later steel, which acted to 
strengthen connections between economic activities and conceptions of the nation and 
governmental responsibilities.5   
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It is the institutional and intellectual underpinnings and evolution of the elite ‘project’ 
of planning a new industrial nation which are analysed here. This article focuses on 
the activities of the ‘technocratic’ elements of the Scottish elite, the civil servants and 
academic economists who played a key role in conceptualising and quantifying the 
Scottish economy, and making and applying policy to develop the Scottish industrial 
nation between the 1930s and 1970s.  These activities were shaped by the widely 
shared understandings considered in the previous paragraph but were nevertheless 
very much the activities of a socially restricted elite grouping. This article aims to 
enhance our understanding of modern Scotland, and, more broadly, the nature of the 
forces leading to the imagining of nations through economic concepts and policies. 
The article is not concerned with party politics, but it does link the development 
of certain economic policy positions to the arguments of those who, in retrospect, 
are seen to have embraced ‘Unionist-Nationalism’. Their politics combined a 
strong commitment to the maintenance of the Union of 1707, with an equally 
strong view about the need for a distinctively Scottish approach to economic 
policy issues. Thus where ‘Unionist-Nationalism’ was a term originally applied to 
approaches to the relations between the UK state and civil society in nineteenth-
century Scotland, we argue for its relevance to the mid-twentieth century 
development of understandings of ‘economic society.’ 6 
 
The first section provides the context of the drive to economic planning and the 
associated assumptions and practices within Britain as a whole. The second shows the 
development of a specific Scottish understanding of desirable economic change, 
underpinned by a range of intellectual and institutional factors. The context of 
administrative devolution, and the role of the Scottish Office in policy-making, and as 
a key body which connected civil servants and academic economists, is profiled. Alec 
Cairncross is examined in both sections as a key actor who bridged the divide 
between UK and Scottish level policymaking. His championing of applied economics 
in Scotland, with a focus on to industry, is analysed alongside his strong support for a 
conception of the Scottish economy as a distinct identity. However, he is also 
understood as operating between ‘unionist’ and ‘nationalist’ impulses, given his role 
as a UK government advisor and the definite limits to his vision of a differentiated 
Scottish economy. The third section traces the evolution of an understanding of the 
‘Scottish industrial nation’, and its relationship with an evolving planning agenda and 
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the extension of administrative devolution, through the decades to the 1970s. The 
final part offers some tentative conclusions.  
               
I 
 
The Great Depression of the 1930s shifted the political economy of Britain towards 
‘economic planning’, if that term is used in its broadest sense to suggest that some 
kind of deliberate control should replace (or at least supplement) the operations of the 
market economy.7 In the 1930s ‘planning’ was an incoherent notion, supported by 
ideologues and politicians across the political spectrum, from Oswald Mosley’s New 
Party on the Right, through Macmillan’s Middle Way to the Communist Party on the 
Left. The policies actually implemented in this period were much more modest than 
many proposed, combining steps towards a particular type of managed economy at 
the macroeconomic level, and limited moves towards ‘corporatist’ planning at the 
microeconomic level.8   
 
The Second World War fundamentally shifted the relationship between the state and 
the economy. At the macroeconomic level, the politically crucial desire to contain 
inflation led to the ‘first Keynesian budget’ in 1941, and the parallel development of 
statistics and mechanisms of control aimed at balancing overall supply and demand. 
Alongside this ‘macroeconomic planning’ developed an immense administrative and 
statistical apparatus to channel the maximum of resources, including labour, into 
producing for the war effort. 9 While the effectiveness of this planning has been 
disputed, it seems clear that the wartime experience reinforced the belief across much 
of the political spectrum that planning was the road to effective post-war 
reconstruction and economic security, rather than the ‘Road to Serfdom’.10  Not the 
least of the war’s legacies was the apparatus constructed to move work to the workers, 
a policy continued in post-war regional policy.11 For the Labour Government of 1945 
greater planning of the economy was a central part of its agenda, though the precise 
meaning to be attached to this term was much disputed at the time, and historians 
have stressed the diversity of interpretations at work in the government’s planning 
activities.12 
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Most analysts of the Attlee government see some retreat from more radical versions 
of economic planning in the late 1940s, and a partial replacement of these by a 
Keynesian emphasis on macroeconomic management.13 But such a trend should not 
be exaggerated; Labour was keen to hang on to a wide range of economic controls to 
supplement budgetary and monetary policy, and to continue to influence major 
developments in the economy.14 
 
A key figure linking these British developments to subsequent events in Scotland is 
Alec Cairncross. A Scot, Cairncross spent most of the war as a planner in the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production, and for much of the late 1940s was economic adviser to the 
Board of Trade.15 Debates about planning in the 1940s have been characterised as 
a battle between ‘thermostatters’, advocates of macroeconomic planning, and 
‘gosplanners’, supporters of Soviet-style detailed planning of output.16 Within 
this dichotomy Cairncross was undoubtedly a ‘thermostatter’. This meant a 
considerable scepticism about the capacity of state agencies to plan economic 
activity, but by no means the advocacy of a ‘laissez-faire’ belief in the 
beneficence of unregulated markets. However, this dichotomy is really too crude 
to capture Cairncross’s evolving position. His Whitehall experience strengthened  
his support for two things: an applied economics grounded in detailed statistical 
knowledge of the economy, especially its production capacity, and close collaboration 
(but not direction) between state agencies and industry to achieve policy goals. This 
was the legacy he was to take to Scotland when he became Professor of Political 
Economy in Glasgow in 1951. 
 
This appointment coincided with the election of a Conservative government that 
partially delivered on their promises to ‘set the people free’, by, eventually, scrapping 
rationing and many other controls inherited from Labour. However, there was no 
return to laissez-faire; not only was macro-management highly active (‘stop-go’), but 
attempts to shape economic development continued, through, for example, trade 
policy, where tariffs and quotas were actively deployed within a broad trend to 
liberalisation. 17 
 
Conservatives in the 1950s largely eschewed the language of planning, but the term 
tentatively returned to their vocabulary in the early 1960s, when declinist attacks on 
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their stewardship of the economy led to the ‘great re-assessment’, and the attempt to 
use a variety of instruments to improve the growth of the economy.18 Much of what 
they began was taken-up and added-to by Labour after 1964, but with a new 
ideological emphasis on the positive merits of planning. This culminated in the 
National Plan of 1965, an Anglicised version of French-style ‘indicative planning’, 
which marked the high-water mark of public use of the term in post-war Britain.19 
The failure of the Plan to deliver its target four per cent rate of growth helped deflate 
the language of planning. The Conservatives after 1970 asserted a renewed faith in 
market mechanisms (however much compromised in practice), while the 1974-1979 
Labour government produced no Plan to rival that of 1965. 
 
The extension of the economic role of the state brought with it two important and 
inter-twined developments in the UK state apparatus; a much increased employment 
of economists, and a huge increase in the production of official economic statistics.  
 
The penetration of economists into the British state was very slow before 1939. While 
economic expertise was on occasion mobilised in the 1930s, as with the Economic 
Advisory Council from 1930, such expertise was held largely at arm’s length by the 
state. 20 However, the war rapidly multiplied the number of economists in state 
service. The creation of an Economic Section in the Cabinet Office provided a central 
advisory role for economists, but economists were also employed on a substantial 
scale in various ministries, notably in Supply and Aircraft Production.21 
 
When many of the economists drawn into government service by the war left for 
academia after 1945, the numbers employed in government stayed stable until the 
mid-1960s when they shot-up from 22 in 1964 to 352 in 1975. 22  One of the tropes of 
these government economists was the need to expand and improve economic 
statistics, and in this endeavour they were part of a broader process. 
 
The twentieth-century growth of economic statistics was part of a much wider 
phenomenon: as many authors have suggested, an explosion in the production and 
dissemination of statistics is a key feature of modernity. Badiou, for example, notes, 
‘The ideology of modern parliamentary societies, if they have one, is not humanism, 
law or the subject. It is number, the countable, countability’.23  ‘Countability’, in turn, 
6 
 
has been central to the economic imagination. As Tooze remarks, ‘Today, statistics 
define our knowledge of the economy.’24   Unsurprisingly, this close interconnection 
has been most obvious when economists have sought to plan the economy; the 
economy they desired to exert control over had to be imagined in measurable form. 
 
To post-war eyes the state of economic statistics in 1939 was lamentable: ‘there were 
virtually no official aggregates of the kind we now take for granted: no GNP, no index 
of industrial production, no balance of payments (except in very tentative form) no 
adequate consumer price index, and so on’.25 Cairncross goes on to argue that after 
1940 there was a revolution in UK economic statistics under the stimulus of war, 
covering especially labour and production, alongside the macroeconomic data 
necessary for budgetary policy. This revolution is symbolised by the creation of the 
Central Statistical office (CSO) in 1940/41. 26 In his discussion of the Attlee years, 
Cairncross celebrates how much better-equipped that government was to address 
economic policy problems because of the much enhanced quality of available 
statistics, though he does emphasize the poor quality of data on international capital 
movements and domestic capital formation.27 
 
But by the 1950s, with attacks on the conduct of economic policy growing, serious 
criticism of the state of economic statistics was renewed. Such criticism was famously 
expressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, in 1956, when he 
argued that trying to steer the economy with such out of date statistics was ‘looking 
up a train in last year’s Bradshaw’.28  Such views were echoed when the Radcliffe 
Committee examined the conduct of monetary policy two years later.29 But if data for 
macroeconomic management were seen as inadequate, there were much more serious 
problems when it came to the planning of the supply-side, which re-emerged as a key 
concern from the early 1960s with the ‘great reassessment’. 30 
 
In the mid-1960s the Treasury view as expressed to the Estimates Committee on 
government statistical services was that economic statistics for short term demand 
management were ‘satisfactory’.31 But this was not the view of Cairncross, who had 
returned to Whitehall as the chief economic adviser in 1961.32  In 1965 he identified a 
range of priorities for improvement, focussed on demand management issues, 
especially investment statistics, his bete noire.33 The unreliability of much of the data 
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economic managers had to work with is a staple feature of his many discussions of the 
1960s. 34 Other key figures concur.35 Unreliability meant not simply ‘not enough’-in 
some cases too much very poor material was being churned out. For example, much 
monthly data which was extraordinarily unreliable, and publication was halted in the 
early 1960s. 36 Another problem belying any simple notion of a progressive filling of 
data gaps was that, as more numbers were produced, the discrepancies between 
different data sets became more glaring.37 
 
Accompanying the continuing traumas of short term macro management in the 1960s 
were the Labour government attempts to avoid the ‘errors’ of ‘stop-go’ by pursuing a 
range of more interventionist policies aimed at reconciling a  value of $2.80 for the 
pound with faster growth. This led to new or renewed emphasis on three policy areas 
with major implications for economic statistics. These areas were economic planning, 
incomes policy, and higher productivity. The pursuit of each of these led to an 
intensified ‘technocratic’ search for better data. But at the same time, pursuit of each 
of these policies was also about managing the understanding and behaviour of the 
population. In this context, economic statistics were not only tools for central 
government the better to manipulate newly-prioritised aggregates, but weapons of 
mass persuasion in what Wilson called ‘the new battle of Britain’. 38 
 
The focus on the supply-side in trying to raise the growth rate of the economy was 
accompanied by an overwhelming focus on the industrial sector the economy, and an 
accompanying focus on industrial statistics. This belief in the centrality of industry is 
very clear in the 1965 National Plan, which has detailed discussion of industrial 
sectors, plus some analysis of agriculture, construction and energy, but with almost no 
attention to the service sector. Logically this belief would lead to policies such as the 
Selective Employment Tax, which sought to raise the cost of labour in the service 
sector to free-up more workers for industry, in the belief that this would raise the 
overall level of productivity. 39 While this particular policy measure was highly 
controversial, and soon reversed, it was emblematic of widely-shared views about the 
British economy; while views on how to change that economy increasingly diverged 
by the 1970s, it was still common ground that it was industry that was the core of 
economic activity. 
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     II 
 
These trends in the UK influenced developments in Scotland, but there were also 
distinctive aspects to that country’s economic trajectory. Since the Union of 1707 the 
Scottish economy had been highly integrated with the rest of Britain. But it had also, 
by the late nineteenth century, become highly ‘globalized’, particularly because of a 
greater disproportionate dependence on international trade. than the UK as a whole. 
This went along with an industrial structure, in which the export-oriented ‘old staple’ 
sectors of coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering and jute had a greater 
weight than in the UK as a whole.40 
 
It was inter-war unemployment that first focussed attention on Scotland’s industrial 
structure. The predominance of the ‘old staples’ made Scotland particularly 
vulnerable to the Great Depression of the 1930s. That depression, as noted above, 
stimulated a new willingness to depart in limited areas from ‘laissez-faire’ at the UK 
level. But as far as domestic industrial development was concerned those limits were 
severe. In the 1920s the main policy response to mass unemployment was a focus on 
‘Industrial Transference’, encouraging the migration of workers from depressed areas. 
In the 1930s political pressures for a more effective response to mounting joblessness 
and stalling economic development in areas reliant on staple industries led to 
regional surveys, and subsequently the creation of ‘special areas’ defined by high 
levels of unemployment. Here we can see the creation of the ‘regional problem’, 
grounded in new geographical categorizations and statistics, that was to inform 
British economic policy for decades. 41 Commissioners were appointed to look at 
possible remedies, including one for Scotland, but their suggestions were only 
acceptable to Whitehall if they involved a focus on reducing unemployment without 
direct interference with private decision-making. 42  
 
Whitehall Departments were not only resistant to radical departures in employment 
policy, but also extremely sensitive to any suggestion that Scotland as a unit had 
problems which were distinct from those of the UK as a whole. But the Scottish 
Office, as it grew in both stature and prestige, began to evolve a sense that there was 
indeed a distinctiveness that needed to be addressed.43 Such bureaucratic sensitivities 
seem to accord with broader opinion, indicated, for example, by the creation of the 
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Scottish National Development Council (SNDC) in 1931, and the Scottish Economic 
Council in 1936.  These sensitivities, spurred by concerns about the impact of war 
demand on the shape of the economy, led to the creation of the Scottish Council on 
Industry in 1942. The SNDC and Scottish Council on Industry merged in 1946 to 
establish the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) which played an influential 
role in shaping policy and bringing together a policy elite combining voices from 
business, the civil service and academic economics.44 
 
McKenzie’s research indicates that the interwar crisis predicated post-Second World 
War policy priorities. A novel brand of “economic unionist-nationalism” was the 
predominant ideology of the industrialists who dominated the SNDC. This envisioned 
the “rationalisation and diversification” of Scottish industry; heavy industry was to be 
modernised, whilst new sectors of light manufacturing, which were prospering in the 
South East of England and which Scotland had failed to indigenously develop, were 
to be attracted. 45 These objectives were to be achieved within the framework of the 
British state, and in particular an enlarged and empowered Scottish Office, which in 
due course ‘led the way in promoting this notion of a Scottish national economic 
interest.’ 46 
 
By the mid-1930s the language of planning permeated Scottish discussions of the 
economic future, as in the UK as a whole. Parliamentary and public debates routinely 
repudiated the ‘laissez-faire’ approach which saw the state’s role as largely limited to 
encouraging the workers to move to where work was available, in favour of seeking 
to shape developments by ‘planning’. 47 The language of planning in Scotland was 
almost invariably linked to the notion that unplanned development had left Scotland 
over reliant on ‘older and traditional’ industries, and that the core aim of planning was 
to encourage ‘newer industries’. 48 This notion drew on local initiatives in Scotland 
dating back to the beginning of the 1930s, such as the Development Board for 
Glasgow (1930), or the ‘Do It in Dundee’ campaign from 1931.49 But it was taken up 
more broadly at the political level by the end of the decade, and, supported by 
employers, which was encapsulated in the Scottish Economic Committee’s Scotland’s 
Industrial Future: the Case for Planned Development (1939). The underlying 
assumption was ‘that future growth would not be substantial in the older industries 
and in those where Scotland was already well-represented’; the most practical 
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expression of this view before 1939 was the creation of Scottish Industrial Estates in 
1937, aimed at attracting ‘footloose’ industries to the country.50 
 
Despite these elements of policy devolution, the level of economic integration 
between Scotland and England, coupled to Whitehall’s concern to discourage any 
sense of separateness, meant that economic statistics which treated Scotland as a 
primary unit of analysis hardly existed before 1945. This is most obvious in relation 
to macroeconomic data: while the first National Income accounts for Scotland were 
constructed in the 1950s, no official data were published until the 1970s, and only 
today are their efforts to construct comprehensive historical accounts. 51 A similar 
absence relates to other macroeconomic data; there are no systematic historical 
balance of payments data, nor estimates of a Scottish inflation rate. 52 However, 
Scottish data on unemployment rates exist from the 1930s, with Scotland designated 
as a ‘region’ of the UK for specification of the ‘regional problem’.  
 
During the Second World War the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, 
commissioned reports on the Clyde Valley, the Highlands and Central and South 
Eastern Scotland. The last of these argued for a collective Scottish position as the 
basis for policy, suggesting that ‘the interests of Scotland as a whole will best be 
served if consideration is given to a more widely planned dispersal’ of population 
from Glasgow.53 The interwar focus on industrial diversification was continued, and 
rationalised in economic and social terms. Traditional industries such as textiles had 
‘a bad unemployment history before the war and were likely to continue to be 
unstable.’ This was juxtaposed to ‘Modern industry [which] is not on the whole so 
strongly localised as older established industry’, and would therefore, it was hoped, be 
easier to draw to Scotland given that manufacturing plant in consumer goods 
industries are less dependent on the location of natural resources.54 
 
Thus, while the Second World War reinforced political unionism by encouraging a 
sense of Britishness (and this was underpinned in the early post-war years by the 
creation of powerful new UK-wide institutions in the NHS and nationalised 
industries) the impetus from the 1930s towards building a separate administrative 
apparatus in Scotland was sustained. This apparatus, as already suggested, had begun 
to articulate a view of a distinct Scottish industrial nation in the 1930s, and Johnston’s 
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wartime activities extended this vision. In the early post-war years this combination of 
a strengthened political unionism but a growing sense of economic difference was, 
paradoxically, further enhanced by the extended scope of the UK state, as the 
rejection of ‘laissez-faire’ manifested itself in policy measures which, unintentionally, 
underpinned notions of ‘a Scottish industrial economy.’ Here we can see a 
distinctive (if unavowed) ‘Unionist-Nationalism’ at work.     
 
Crucial here was the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act, a key moment in the 
development of the understanding of the ‘Scottish industrial nation’. This was partly 
because it created the apparatus for the collection of much more industrial data, on 
both employment and investment, data which clearly distinguished Scotland (as a 
‘region’) from other parts of the UK.  But more broadly, the workings of the Act 
shifted Scotland to a different industrial structure by attracting predominantly 
‘footloose’ as opposed to resource-reliant industries, and  this  became an integral part  
of the meaning of ‘industrial Scotland’. For economic modernizers, it fitted with the 
widespread notion that Scotland needed to change its industrial structure, and attract 
foreign, both English and American, investment; bringing in mobile ‘modern 
industry’ was to be central to the new industrial Scotland. 
 
The influx of American manufacturing investment from the 1940s was particularly 
significant for the re-shaping of industrial Scotland, and generated a great deal of 
debate, both contemporaneous and historical. Most initial responses were positive, but 
later doubts became common, partly for pragmatic reasons about the significance for 
the achievement of economic goals, but also for broader reasons concerning the whole 
notion of a ‘Scottish economy’. On the pragmatic aspect, criticisms arose from the 
perceived ‘branch plant’ character of much of this new investment, suggesting the 
creation of factories concerned only with assembly, peripheral to the main activities 
of the company. This feature, it was believed, both deprived Scotland of crucial 
activity in R&D, and made Scottish plants vulnerable to strategic decisions made 
outwith the country. In 1967 the newly-created Scottish Economic Planning Board  
noted that between1962 and 1967 engineering redundancy rates had more than 
doubled, from below to above average for the Scottish workforce. This centred on the 
“other machinery” category which largely consisted of electronics and electrical 
engineering. Between 1962 and 1966 Scottish employment in electronics increased by 
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over 50 per cent but only by 14 per cent in Britain as a whole whilst Scotland’s share 
of industrial R&D fell relatively and absolutely.  An official pessimistically concluded 
‘at least to some extent the trends result from structural factors such as the large 
number of branch factories in Scotland in these growth sectors of industry controlled 
form Headquarters elsewhere.’ This outcome was particularly ‘disturbing because of 
the great emphasis we have attached to the long term change in the Scottish industrial 
structure, resulting from the increase in modern science-based engineering and 
electrical industries.’55 
 
Criticism of the ‘branch-plant’ character of American investment points to one of the 
tensions in seeing this investment as part of an unambiguous ‘modernization’ of 
Scottish industry. In other dimensions, too, this ‘modernization’ was ambiguous in its 
effects. American firms typically brought a larger scale of production, but this was 
associated with poor industrial relations.56 
 
In the 1970s these various pragmatic concerns fused into a broader disquiet with the 
production of data showing how far control of industry in Scotland had been 
redistributed away from the country, especially to England and the USA. As a pioneer 
of this analysis argued ‘it is becoming difficult to talk meaningfully of a distinct 
“Scottish economy” except in a strict geographical sense. Instead one is seeing the 
development of increasingly strong links with the world economic system, although 
these links are often hidden within the global operations of the multinational parent 
companies of Scottish subsidiaries and branch plants’.57 
 
As we have seen, in the UK the growth in belief in economic planning both derived 
from and drove forward the increased employment of economists and the related 
expansion of the production of official economic statistics. This was a largely 
uncontroversial trajectory, few challenging the technocratic understanding of the 
modern state on which it was based. But in Scotland, the nation without a state, these 
matters were more complex. 
 
While the UK state saw a rapid expansion of employment of professional economists 
in senior advisory positions in the 1960s, in Scotland no such employment occurred 
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until 1972, when Gavin McCrone became the Chief Economic Adviser to the Scottish 
Office, a post he held in conjunction with other offices until 1992.58 
 
This did not mean that prior to McCrone’s appointment economists were uninvolved 
in official discussion of the Scottish economy; as in the UK, they were central to the 
project of planning the industrial nation, but their role was never as embedded in the 
state apparatus. However, there were some examples of making use of such expertise, 
for instance in 1950 the Board of Trade commissioned the American Economist, R.L 
Meier, to write a report titled ‘Industrial Planning in Scotland’. Even at this relatively 
early post-Second World War stage in regional policy development Scotland was 
treated as ‘a distinct region in a much larger economy.’ The report emphasised the 
role of ‘new technology’ and industries in terms which became characteristic of post-
1945 regional policy. The Board would endeavour to aid the development of new 
industries including chemicals and synthetic fibres, with an aim of enhancing labour 
productivity and avoiding the pitfalls of reliance on the ‘steam and steel complex’ 
exposed during the interwar period. 59 
 
Cairncross was a key figure in debate about the Scottish economy in the 1950s and 
into the 1960s.60 He gave evidence to the Catto Committee on Scottish Financial and 
Trade Statistics, and chaired the Local Development Committee set up by the Scottish 
Council on Development and Industry in 1951/2.   Above all, he was a key member of 
the Toothill Committee, established in 1959, and whose Report, discussed in detail in 
section III below, was the single most important official publication on the Scottish 
economy in the post-war decades. 61  Apart from these official roles, Cairncross 
played a major part in encouraging and shaping empirical debate on the Scottish 
economy in the 1950s. He was the driving force behind the re-establishment of the 
Scottish Economic Society in 1953 and the publication of the Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy from 1954.  In his introduction to the first issue of this new journal 
Cairncross conjured up a Scottish tradition of economics, with a bent towards 
approaching ‘social and economic problems on a broad front, employing an empirical, 
matter-of-fact treatment rather than a highly abstract analysis’.62 Alongside this, both 
the Society and the Journal were intended to appeal beyond professional economists 
to Scottish educated opinion. This applied, empirical approach made Cairncross a 
powerful advocate of expanding the statistical apparatus available to economic policy 
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makers, and the landmark book he edited on the Scottish economy whilst Professor at 
Glasgow was sub-titled ‘A Statistical Account of Scottish Life’.63 However, as 
already noted, he had little sympathy with Scottish nationalism and regarded the idea 
of separate balance of payments figures for the country as erecting ‘a new Hadrian’s 
wall.’ 64 
 
After Cairncross’s return to Whitehall in 1961 a direct role for academic economists 
in Scottish policy-making was set-up through the meetings of an economic 
consultants committee to the Scottish Development Department, which was 
established at the behest of the Toothill report and represented a significant step 
forward in the unionist-nationalist administrative devolution agenda. 65 The 
committee first met in December 1962, and monthly thereafter.66 Its initial members 
were Professors Donald Robertson, Thomas Wilson, and Archibald Campbell, three 
economists with diverse specialisms, but who shared Cairncross’s commitment to 
economics as an empirical, applied discipline.67 (Wilson had been vice-chair of 
Toothill).   
 
The economic consultants had no one consistent ‘line’ on economic policy in 
Scotland, but they did show some scepticism about the priority accorded by the Board 
of Trade to attracting new industry, and argued that ‘changes within existing Scottish 
industry were probably more important’. At later meetings the economists were 
assured that help was available for existing industries to modernise, but the view was 
still that there was more support for incoming firms. 68 
 
A similar theme can be found in the consultants’ discussion of the Toothill report (see 
below), which they argued put excessive focus on ‘new’ industries; they accepted 
Toothill’s stress on growth, but thought this should include ‘modernization’ of ‘old’ 
industries.69 However, Scottish Development Department’s records are indicative of 
Harvie and Foster’s conclusions that Toothill effectively abandoned any commitment 
to developing indigenously controlled Scottish heavy industry in favour of a growing 
reliance on externally controlled capital in light engineering.70 For instance in 1965 
T.R.H Godden of the SDD’s Distribution of Industry Panel argued for transferring 
engineering labour into light industries, expressing concern at the ‘present somewhat 
artificially high level of activity in Clyde[ship] yards, which was leading them to try 
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and claw back skilled labour, could not be without its disadvantages in the long-term 
if a temporary aggravated shortage of key skills were to make it more difficult for 
Scotland to attract different kinds of industry having a more expansionist long-term 
future.’71 
 
London’s concern with Scottish economic issues was partly a function of the 
perceived strength of Scottish nationalism. In the early 1950s the degree of 
separateness of the Scottish economy was a bone of contention in political and official 
circles.72 One result of this tension was a Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs 1952-
1954. The setting up of this commission clearly arose from discontent with a 
perceived lack of concern with Scottish interests in London.73 These pressures were 
also reflected in the setting-up of the Catto Committee, which called for the revival of 
separate Scottish budget accounts, but resisted the idea of producing Scottish trade or 
balance of payments data. 74  
 
One consequence of the absence of balance of payments data was that Scottish 
economic discussions were less obsessed with the external payments position than 
contemporary debate in the UK, debate that was central right down to the introduction 
of floating exchange rates in the early 1970s. This contrast was added to by the 
common assumption that unemployment was the highest priority in Scotland-perhaps 
even more than in the rest of the UK. This emphasis is demonstrated through Meier’s 
report and responses to it. The report notes that ‘the history of joblessness has been 
responsible for the emphasis upon full employment in the reconstruction and 
reorganization of Scottish industry over the past five years.’ Its focus is upon the 
provision of stable work and diversification through ‘new industries.’75 
Correspondence between Board of Trade officials cast doubt on Meier granting 
legitimacy to Dundee jute employer’s concern that there would soon be a labour 
shortage to argue for an end to placing major new industrial sites there.76 
 
In Scotland, economists played their usual role as advocates of improved economic 
statistics. For example, in a paper for the Toothill Committee, Peacock and Dosser 
itemised major deficiencies in the data, ranging across National Income, industrial 
production, private investment, and wages and prices. They noted but did not focus 
attention on the paucity of data on the non-industrial sector, concluding ‘if it is 
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reasonable to regard Scotland as a region which is sufficiently distinct and important 
to have a distinct policy for economic development, then the statistical information 
available is far from adequate’. The paper suggested the lack of information might 
derive from an absence of understanding of how much it was needed, but clearly 
implied that the main reason was ‘the non-acceptance of the region as a separate unit 
in policy-making.’77 A hostile response from the Scottish Statistical Office not only 
suggested these criticisms of data availability were exaggerated, but also emphasised 
that Scotland was not a ‘self-governing and fiscally independent country’ and by 
implication questioned how far it could or should have a distinct policy approach, and 
therefore the need for more specifically Scottish statistics. 78 
 
 
              III  
One obvious issue in defining the industrial nation was spatial, which was inter-
woven with questions about the sectoral composition of industry. Where were 
the internal boundaries of ‘industrial Scotland’, and what were the implications 
of this notion for those (geographically extensive) parts of Scotland where industry 
was thin on the ground?  Historically, ‘industrial Scotland’ had been closely 
associated (explicitly and implicitly) with ‘the Clyde Valley’ or ‘West Central 
Scotland’, with other industrial areas given a subordinate status. 79 This continued to 
be the case in much official discourse in the post-war period, with most focus on the 
Western central belt. Thus in the 1960s there were two Scottish economic plans, the 
first concerned with West Central Scotland, which as defined in this plan contained 90 
per cent of Scotland’s manufacturing industry, whilst the second covered the whole of 
Scotland.80 
 
This West Central focus was recognised to be problematic, and this had already led to 
the setting-up of a ‘Local Development Committee’ in 1951 to look at industry in 
smaller towns. 81 This Committee produced data showing how widespread 
manufacturing industry was in Scotland, with only just over 50 per cent in Glasgow 
and the surrounding area. The focus on manufacturing is perhaps also misleading; 
coal mining, railways and port transport were typically considered part of the 
‘industrial nation’ but were not recorded (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Distribution of manufacturing in 1948 
Area Insured persons in 
manufacturing 1948 
Proportion of total for 
Scotland (percentage) 
Glasgow 424,660 55.0 
Edinburgh and Lothians 80,599 10.4 
Kilmarnock and North 
Ayrshire 
45,532 5.9 
Dundee 43,984 5.7 
Falkirk and Stirling 43,850 5.7 
Aberdeen 28,308 3.7 
Total: major industrial 
areas 
666,933 86.4 
Rest of Scotland 104,938 13.6 
Grand total 771,871 100 
 
Source: Glasgow University Archives (GUA) Cairncross papers DC106/5A/4 ‘Draft 
Report of Local Development Committee’ 1951. 
 
These figures make the exclusion of Edinburgh from most discussion of ‘industrial 
Scotland’ especially striking. Not only was Edinburgh the administrative capital of 
Scotland, where much of the official discussion of ‘Industrial Scotland’ originated, 
but it was also a significant industrial centre, with over half of its employed 
population in industry in 1951 and a leading location for Scottish brewing and 
distilling.  However, partly as a deliberate strategy on the part of the local authority, 
Edinburgh never presented itself as an ‘industrial city’, but rather as a historical and 
administrative centre.82 So the industrial nation was always in part geographically 
‘exclusive’. 
 
Another hugely important spatial aspect was the role on ‘New Towns’. Whilst 
this was a policy pursued in other parts of the UK, it was especially ambitious in 
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Scotland, notably in relation to Glasgow. 83 The aim was to shift very large 
numbers out of the tenements of the central city, and move them to new towns 
which would be both attractive places to live and offer attractive environments 
for new industrial development, especially in ‘new’, light manufacturing 
industries. Recent research suggests that there were contemporary concerns that 
this policy would ‘skim the cream’ of the Glasgow population and worsen the 
city’s problems. 84 But at the time of its conception this approach seemed to 
combine a major attack on the slums with industrial modernization conceived in 
both geographical and sectoral terms. 
 
Not separately identified in the table above are figures for the Highlands and Islands, 
the region hardest to fit into the image of an industrial nation, with its vast acres of 
land, but little industrial activity. One approach was to try to industrialise the 
Highlands.85 Such a project was full of complications. The dominance of 
unemployment as the primary concern of economic planning in the early post-war 
period did not fit with the Highlands, where policy was driven by depopulation by 
out-migration. Those who argued for industrial expansion in the region conjured up 
the notion of ‘growth poles’ avant la lettre, aiming to site industrial development not 
in areas suffering unemployment, but those locations which seemed to offer the best 
hopes of economic growth. Yet, the depth of the commitment to a Scottish ‘industrial 
nation’ is reflected in the scale of resources which were expended trying to extend it 
Northwards through Highland industrialisation. In spite of its predominantly rural 
character of the region and its traditional reliance on agrarian and fisheries activities, 
the area was designated for major industrial projects in the post-Second World War 
period. This was intensified following the inception of the Highland and Islands 
Development Board in 1965 which supported significant projects, including a smelter 
in Invergordon and a pulp mill near Fort William.86 
 
Notwithstanding issues surrounding the depopulation of the Highlands, there is no 
doubt that debate and policy on the post-war Scottish economy and its industrial 
structure and performance was dominated by unemployment. And this was 
underpinned by the existence of extremely good data on unemployment in all its 
dimensions, generated as a result of the National Insurance system. The tracking of 
unemployment data was intense from the 1940s.87  
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It should be stressed that contemporary discussions took for granted a labour market 
highly-segmented in terms of gender, but exhibited a strong concern for the 
employment prospects of men as well as women. Indeed, a shift from male-dominated 
to more gender-balanced sectors was part of the ‘modernization’ envisaged. Rather 
than focussing exclusively on men’s employment, a common worry at the time was 
that the expansion of new industrial sectors would be constrained by a shortage of 
women workers.88 
 
An important feature of the post-war settlement’s focus on unemployment was the 
1944 White Paper on Employment Policy, which embodied the assumption of a 
‘contract’ between state and worker, in which ‘high and stable’ employment would 
require an acceptance of both mobility and a willingness to raise productivity by 
workers. This fed into discussion about industry in a number of ways, but perhaps was 
most significant in the current context for its relationship to debates about 
actual/possible/desirable mobility of labour.89 This issue was complicated in Scotland 
by the impact of the enormous relocation of population brought about by the 
demolition of large parts of central Glasgow and the movement of population to 
peripheral new towns. In this way ‘urban planning’ drove a forced mobility of labour. 
‘Bringing work to the workers’ therefore meant not moving jobs into central 
Glasgow, but trying to get incoming firms to locate in these peripheral towns.90 
 
The focus on employment and unemployment in post-war Scotland is wholly 
unsurprising; Scotland was a nation of wage earners: a ‘proletarian nation’.91 The 
extent to which Scotland was also perceived as  an ‘industrial nation’ depended in part 
on understandings and definitions of industry. Whilst in 1958, the peak of staple 
industry employment, just under 37% of Scottish employment was in manufacturing, 
the additional 3.9% in mining  6% in construction, 2.8% in gas and electricity, 8.3% 
in transport and communications and 11.2% in distribution are indicative of 
significant sectors which included occupations with ‘industrial’ work cultures and 
working class identities. Prime examples include coal miners, dockers and railway 
workers. (Table 2). 
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Table 2   Scottish GDP by industry of origin, 1958. 
 
 Scotland 1958 UK 1958 Wales 1956 NIreland 1952 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing 
6.0 4.5 5.7 18.4 
Mining and 
quarrying 
3.9 3.6 11.7 0.4 
Manufacturing 36.4 35.6 33.2 30.0 
Construction 6.0 6.0 7.2 7.2 
Gas, electricity 
and water 
2.8 2.7 3.0 2.1 
Transport and 
Communications 
8.3 8.0 8.2 7.3 
Distribution 11..2 12.7 9.2 13.2 
Insurance , 
banking and 
finance 
2.0 2.9 2.1 2.0 
Other services 9.2 10.1 8.8 6.1 
Public Admin 
and Defence 
6.4 6.3 5.5 4.9 
Public Health  1.9 1.7 4.5 (including 
education) 
2.8 
Local authority 
education 
2.4 2.0  2.1 
Rent from 
ownership of 
dwellings 
3.0 3.5 3.3 1.5 
Domestic 
service 
0.4 0.5 0.4 2.0 
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Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: GUA DC Cairncross papers 104/1/1 ‘Industry and employment in Scotland 
1962-63’, citing official data. 
 
 
While many aspects of the debate about industrial Scotland shifted significantly in the 
three decades after 1945, all agencies and commentators assumed that the problems of 
industry were the key economic question: Cairncross summarised this view: ‘The 
picture that emerges is one of an industrial economy that shows signs of lagging 
behind the rest of the country.’92 While, of course, the decline of individual industrial 
sectors was well-recognised, there was no sense of a secular trend to de-
industrialization. This commitment to industry was a deeply embedded cultural 
assumption (not, of course, confined to Scotland), rather than grounded in economic 
theory, which did not seriously address this issue until the 1960s, when Kaldor and 
Baumol examined it from very different perspectives.93 This attitude both sustained, 
and was in turn sustained by the economic statistics produced (both at UK and 
Scottish level) which focused on industry: these included the index of industrial 
production and the Censuses of Production, both of which excluded agriculture, 
forestry and fishing, transport and distribution, financial and administrative services. 
 
So the Scottish economic debate focused on different ways of thinking about industry, 
underpinned by plentiful data on some of its aspects. The Census of Production, 
which was re-instated in 1948 after a wartime gap was the best established source, 
and used a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) which (amended periodically) 
became the staple source for industrial analysis. Much use was made of SIC in 
detailed studies, though there was recognition of the associated problems.94 
 
The SIC distinguished between industrial sectors at different levels of aggregation. At 
the highest level of aggregation Scotland’s industrial structure looked very similar to 
that of the UK as a whole. At this level industry is divided into broad groups such as 
‘Food, Drink and Tobacco’, ‘Metal Manufacture’, Shipbuilding and Marine 
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Engineering’ ‘Paper, Printing and Publishing’, ‘Vehicles’ and ‘Chemicals and allied 
Trades’. But, as McCrone argued, as of c.1960, ‘the structural disadvantage is more 
apparent within orders than in comparisons between order groups. Thus in Scotland 
vehicles until recently contained no motor car manufacture, and comprised mainly 
commercial vehicles with a heavy weighting of locomotive shops. Food, drink and 
tobacco on Scotland includes whisky manufacture; and textiles are primarily woollen 
and jute textiles.’95     
 
Many of the themes characterising Scotland’s industrial development articulated in 
the 1950s and 1960s drew on the pioneering work of the econometrician C.E.V. 
Leser, some of which was included in the 1954 ‘Scottish Economy’ volume. This 
analysis stressed the lack of key industrial sectors in Scotland, especially vehicles, 
precision instruments, and other light engineering products. Their absence was seen as 
bringing three important disadvantages: ‘It means first, that some of the more 
important growing industries have inadequate roots in Scotland; second that line 
production technique, with all the planning procedures associated with it, are as yet 
unfamiliar to Scottish managements; and third, that the impulse to technological 
advance that comes from the association of new industries withhold is largely 
absent.’96 
 
Where discussion moved away from attracting new firms into Scotland to the 
shortcomings of indigenous firms, the debate about the causes of problems became 
inescapably complex and controversial. Some saw these shortcomings as externally 
imposed. For example a discussion of the ‘Next stage in regional planning’ argued 
that government-funded R&D , mainly located in England, was a major reason for the 
southwards drift of industry.97 This was a version of the ‘branch plant’ criticism often 
levelled at US-owned firms. 
 
The Scottish Economy recognised that most people in the country were employed in 
services, but gave little detailed analysis of this sector. It has a chapter devoted to 
‘production’ which focuses on industry, plus one on manufacturing and one on coal. 
The chapters on public sector (health, education, local government) concentrate on 
finance rather than employment in these sectors. In part this focus was founded on 
statistical availability; the Census of Production was focussed on ‘production 
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industries’ and a Census of Distribution, covering much of the service sector had to 
wait. 
 
After the major step forward in unemployment policy with the 1945 Distribution of 
Industry Act, the 1950s saw a reduction in concern with this issue, and cut backs in 
regional incentives. But at UK government level the late 1950s saw a revival of 
concern about unemployment, and this was strongly reflected in Scotland, where 
unemployment rates had been persistently above those for the UK as a whole. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, from a desire to address this issue came the Toothill enquiry 
which argued for focussing resources on ‘growth points’ rather than on the existing 
‘development districts’ based on unemployment levels. While the report cites 
comparative GNP data (for the UK, not Scotland) it links these figures to the growth 
of industrial production without further ado, hence its claim that ‘Basically, the most 
disturbing of the Scottish statistics are those for industrial production’, so whatever 
the innovations in Toothill’s discussions in other respects, the focus on industry was 
central to its arguments. 98  
 
The notion that history had left Scotland with an out-dated industrial structure was 
formulated in diverse ways. For example, the heavy/light distinction is discussed in 
Toothill, where it is noted that this dichotomy is ‘not commonly used in industry 
itself’. Some contributors to Toothill’s discussions preferred to use ‘capital versus 
consumer goods’, and asserted that Scotland was mainly a capital goods economy, 
and that this predominance had been reinforced since the war by an influx of 
producers of earth moving machinery, BMC commercial vehicles, and office 
machinery.99 This particular distinction was said to be significant in a number of 
ways, but especially because capital goods industries were usually the basis of the 
most important technological changes but ‘I think it is true to say that, with one 
possible exception, no major technical innovation has taken place in Scotland over the 
last 20 years, in fact the last 40 years’. It was also argued that serious problems arose 
through the reliance on imports for consumer goods: ’it is essential to have the 
manufacturing here because of the employment it can give and knowhow that can be 
acquired, it is rather like importing a body without a head’.100 
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The revived UK interest in planning in the 1960s had the result of producing two 
plans for Scotland; one for the Central Belt, one for the whole country. The first of 
these embodied Toothill’s ideas about focusing attention on growth areas, rather than 
on areas of high unemployment. Initially this Report had been greeted with a great 
deal of official scepticism in London, because of its shift away from a specific focus 
on unemployment, but political considerations supervened.101 
 
These Scottish plans, it should be noted, were the only plans published for any sub-
division of Britain. An apparatus of regional planning for the whole country was 
established in 1965, but none of these bodies produced documents equivalent to those 
produced for Scotland. Of course, the use of the language of planning is always 
ambiguous as to where effective power lies. Both the 1960s Scottish plans (like the 
UK National Plan of 1965) were about ‘indicative’ planning, largely focussed on 
encouraging the private sector to take a more expansionary view of the economic 
prospects, rather than ‘ordering’ change. The nearest to dirigiste regional planning in 
the UK was the creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board, which did 
have executive rather than purely advisory powers.102 
 
The Scottish National Plan of 1965  aimed ‘to speed up the evolution of a modern 
industrial structure in Scotland’, a process which had already been partially successful 
It projected a rise in manufacturing employment over the Plan period of 50,000, for 
construction 20,000, and services of 60,000, but saw the development of services as 
primarily ‘important if Scotland is to be an attractive area for incoming industrialists’; 
and only office employment and tourism are seen as making ’direct contribution to 
economic growth’. 103 
 
The last burst of enthusiasm for planning in the vague, but vaguely dirigiste, sense of 
the 1940s and 1960s came with the creation of Scottish Economic Planning 
Department in 1973, and the publication of the West Central Scotland plan in 1974. 
This in turn led to the creation of the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), which 
commenced operations in December 1975. The SDA sustained the focus on industry. 
Hood points to its aim as ‘strengthening the industrial base’ which suggests 
continuity. 104. But such agencies and the understandings that underpinned them were 
becoming in the 1970s the focus of much more fundamental contention. The rise of 
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neoliberalism in the Conservative party reinforced the inclination to see such bodies 
as bringing ‘creeping socialism’, and this notion was linked in critics accounts to the 
Labour government’s much vilified National Enterprise Board.105 The scope of the 
SDA’s role was substantial, and in particular it took over the role of attracting foreign 
investment to Scotland from the Scottish Council Development and Industry (This 
role was in turn shifted to Locate in Scotland in 1981).106  
 
    IV 
 
Although the idea of a long-run transition towards an economy dominated by services 
can be traced back to at least the 1930s, the term  ‘deindustrialization’,  seems not to 
have come into use until the 1970s.107  But the process described under that name has 
characterised Britain since the mid-1950s (Table 3), which shows European-wide 
deindustrialization measured by employment levels. 
 
      Table 3: Industrial employment in Europe 
 
                Peak year      % in industry      % in industry        % fall 
                in peak year        in 1998                 peak to 1998 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
UK       1955                 47.9                      26.6                      44.5 
Belgium               1957                 47.0                      26.1                       44.5  
Switzerland      1964                 48.8                      26.3                       46.1 
Netherlands          1965       41.1                      22.2                       46.0 
Sweden      1965                 42.8            25.7                       40.0  
Germany              1970                 49.3                      35.0       29.0 
Italy                      1971       39.7                      31.9                       19.6 
France                  1973       39.5            25.2                       36.2 
  
 
 Source: C.Feinstein, ‘Structural change in the developed countries in the twentieth 
century’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15 (1999), p.39. 
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This process has been more rapid in Scotland but with broadly the same trajectory as 
the UK as a whole, with decline beginning in the 1950s, especially in coalmining and 
textiles, and then moving to most manufacturing in the 1960s, and with especially fast 
falls in the 1970s and 1980s.108 
 
In retrospect this powerful deindustrialization trend renders particularly striking the 
focus on industry in debates about the Scottish economy up to the 1970s. The point is 
not to subject those involved in these debates to the condescension of posterity, but to 
register how powerful the commitment to industry in the Scottish economic imaginary 
in the decades after 1945 was. This, to reiterate, was such a powerful mentality, 
shared across the political and policymaker spectrum, that the need to explicitly 
defend the commitment seems not to have arisen until the crisis of the 1970s 
unleashed a deindustrialization debate. 
 
How are the underpinnings of this commitment to the ‘industrial nation’ to be 
understood? Unsurprisingly, one source was Scottish industrial owners, some of 
whom, as noted above, were key proponents of modernization from the 1930s. But in 
that decade a degree of administrative devolution to Scotland began the process of 
creating both a notion of Scottish industrial distinctiveness, and an apparatus within 
which the problems of this distinctiveness could be conceptualised, measured and 
addressed. This apparatus was, especially in the early days, only partly distinct from 
the UK state, and shared that state’s growing focus on mobilising economic expertise 
and statistical data in pursuit of widening economic goals. What emerged after 1945 
was an ‘elite project’ encompassing industrialists but also, crucially, technocrats in 
favour of Scottish industrial modernization, based on widespread assumptions about 
the distinctive pathologies of an ‘old-fashioned’ Scottish economy. 
 
To call this an elite project is not to suggest a lack of popular concern with economic 
and industrial matters. Such concern, especially manifested in the desire for full 
employment, was highly important in shaping the political context of the period after 
1945. Nevertheless, much of the argument about how to shape industrial Scotland was 
insulated from immediate politics. Economic planning was coordinated through an 
alliance between key employers, a small state apparatus which was largely cordoned-
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off from immediate electoral considerations, and a coterie of statistical and economic 
experts, mainly university-based. 
 
There has been much debate about whether over the long-run there has been a distinct 
‘Scottish economics’.109 What seems clear is that in the 1950s and 1960s a certain 
style of pragmatic, applied, statistically-focussed economics dominated the Scottish 
economic profession. This style of economics fitted well with the policy-oriented 
needs of the poorly–resourced Scottish state apparatus. From this came a symbiotic 
relationship which provided the intellectual underpinnings for the modernization 
project.   
 
As emphasized above, there were both elements of agreement and disagreement 
amongst proponents of this new industrial Scotland. It is worth emphasizing the most 
striking level of agreement about the future; that it would be industrial, and it would 
need to be brought into being by ‘planning’. There is little evidence in the 1950s and 
1960s, amongst either the employers or the economists or state technocrats of the 
neoliberal, anti-state, thinking already in evidence south of the border. 110 In the 
broadest terms, we can see Scotland beginning to develop a trajectory which in the 
long-run was to make the ‘Unionist-nationalism’ from which the modernizing project 
originated increasingly fragile. 111 
 
While the focus of this article is on Scotland, the approach taken can, we believe, feed 
into wider debates about the history of economic understanding. In part this links to a 
literature which emphasizes the ‘embeddedness’ of economic knowledge in particular 
configurations of the state apparatus, rather than treating that knowledge as an all-
powerful shaper of events (as in many narratives of the ‘rise of Keynesianism’ or ‘the 
rise of neo-liberalism’).112  But beyond that important story of embeddedness, we 
have tried to show, at least in part, how a particular form of economic understanding 
became ‘the common sense of the nation’ something which, in different versions, has 
characterized how many countries have come to see themselves in the twentieth 
century. 113 
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73 Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs, Report,  para 30.  
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